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In the Supreme Court 
of the State 1Jf Utah 
'riiONLA_S HOLLAND, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEROY A. WILSON, JR., as .Ad-
ministrator of the Estate of Le-
Roy A. Wilson, Deceased: 
W.L.RASMUSSEN; VEOLA 
HATCH RASMUSSEN; 
FIRST DOE ; SECOND DOE; 
TI-IIRD :DOE ; FOUI{.TH DO.E, 
and FIFTH DOE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ijNtVERSITY UTAM 
DEC 191958 
~ IJBilA(rt 
No 8853 
REPLY TO BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND 
RESPONDENTS 
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
'ri-IE SIXTH .JUDICIAI1 DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STA'J~E OF UTAH, 
IN AND FOR G_A_RI~,IET_jD COlJNTY 
I-ION. A. I-I. EI.JLETT, ,J-udge 
J~~I.JLrs ,J. PrcKRT'r, 
SAM CLINE, 
Affnrneys for .L4pprdlru11. 
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In the Supretne Court 
of the State 9( Utah 
rrHOJ\!IAS HOLLAND, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VB. 
LEROY A. WILSON, JR., as Ad-
ministrator of the Estate of Le-
Roy A. Wilson, Deceased: 
W. l_.j. RASMUSSEN; VE()LA 
HATCH RASMUSSEN; 
FIRST DOE; SECOND DOE; 
THIRD :DOE; FOUR.TH DOE, 
and FIFTH DOE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No 8853 
REPLY TO BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND 
RESPONDENTS 
We submit that the position of the defendants and 
respondents is untenable wherein they claim that the ac-
tion as brought by the plaintiff and appellant was not a 
·]uiet title action because there 'vas no "prayer for pos-
,.;ession,'' but onlv a prayer for a decree entitling plain-
tiff and appellant to possession. 
The complaint sets forth that the defendants ha(l 
unla,vfully interfered with plaintiff's right to possession 
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2 
and development of the claims, and asks in the prayer 
that a decree be entered entitling them to possession . 
. Also and incidentally, plaintiff asked that defendants be 
perpetually enjoined and restrained from asserting any 
right to the claims, which prayer,. for restraint is inci ... 
dental to quiet title actions. 
It seems a mere play upon words to try and distin-
guish between "being entitled to possession" and "being 
in possession''; and trying lo maintain a position that 
one ·!.vould make the case one of law and the other one of 
equity, when although the defendants did not ask for an 
affirmative decree in their favor quieting title, they nev-
ertheless did have a decree entered which did quiet title 
in them. 
The case was -tried upon ~the theory of a quiet title 
action, as shown by the court's statement as set forth on 
page 7 of appellant's brief, " ... and the record may 
sho"'· that this being a matter· for quiet title, ... " 
Defendant's Point 1 states, "The case at bar is differ-
Put from the cases cited by appellant," and is based 
rnerely upon their contention that any case involving a 
mining claim before patent is issued cannot involYe the 
legal title but only the equitable title. This is not sub-
stantiated by Morrison's J!i11ing Rights, 16 Edition, page 
9, in quoting Da,lton vs. Clark, 129 CaL, App. 136, 18 Pac. 
2d 752, which holds: ''In quiet title Rllits, 'vhile the fee is 
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in the United States, the interests are treated as Estates 
in Fee," to-wit: 
''The trial conrt in its findings and judgment 
acted upon the theory that this was an action to 
quiet title. Assur.oing this is an action to quiet 
title, it is a 'veil-established principle that the 
plaintiff must sho"\\;T title in himself, and cannot 
rely upon lack of title in his adversary. But it is 
also "\\rell settled that, although the title in fee to 
mineral lands is vested in the United States, yet 
as between the claimants of said lands, all rights, 
interests, and estates in the mines are treated as 
being an estate in fee, vesting in such claimants a 
right of property therein, founded upon their pos-
session or appropriation of the land containing 
the mine, and they are treated as between them-
selves and all persons but the United States as the 
owners of the land and mines thereon," Dalton rs. 
Clark, 18 Pac 2d 752. 
]:Iarrison's JJ!ining Rights further states on page 9: 
''The miner's claim or title is real estate as 
distinguished from chattel or personal property 
and is conveyed, ~ned for, descends, is devis::tble 
and is treated in other respects as the real property 
of the occupant, subject only to the paramount title 
of the United Stat~s. '' 
Tc Bradford 1~s. JJ! orris on, 10 Ariz. 214, 86 Pac. 6, 
one of the cases cited by IJJ orrison's Mining Rights, the 
Supreme Court of Arizona announced the followin,~· rules: 
"In the absence of statute, as 'veil as nnrler 
J?;ev. Stat. 1887, par. 2392, declaring- that real 
property shall be coextensive ""ith lands, ten0-
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ments, and hereditaments, an unpatented nnn1ng 
claim is real property, within Acts 1891, p. 70, No. 
50, par. 4, declaring that a judgment, when proper-
ly docketed, shall be a lien on ~the real property of 
the debtor situate jn the county." 
The foregoing Bradford vs. Morrison case was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of the United States (212 
U. S. 389, 53 L. Ed. 564) wherein the rule is announced: 
''Unpatented lode mining claims are 'real 
property' and as such are subject to the lien of a 
judgment recovered against their owner when dock-
eted pursuant to Laws Ariz. 1891, Act. No. 50, ~ 4 
making a docketed judgment a lien upon the judg-
ment debtor's real property, the term being defined 
by a territorial statute in force when the judgment 
in question was rendered and docketed as coexten-
sive with lands, tenements, and hereditaments.'' 
The Bradford vs. ltlorrison case was cited with ap-
proval by the s·upreme Court of Oklahoma in First Na-
tional Ban,k vs. Dunlap, 254 Pac. 729, at pages 735-6. 
. . 
In ~upport of the ;above rule as to the status of an es-
tate ac~uired by the locator of mining claim, see lJit. Rosa 
Min1:ng, Milling and Land Co. rs. ·Palme·r, a Colorado 
case reported in 56 Pac., page 176, particularly see page 
17_~, f~rst paragraph on said pag·e ,,~hich holds: 
"The estate acquired by the locator of a min-
ing claim is an interest in real property, and, al-
though the paramount title remains in the Gov-
~rnn1ent, the Courts ha.Ye uni, ... ersally ·recognized 
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such interest as a free hold, and in all contro-
versies arising between the locator and other 
persons, as to any right or claim thereto, he is 
greeted as the owner in fee." 
J.~indley on Mines, Vol. 2, 3d Ed., page 1194, Sec. 535, 
in treating the nature of the estate in a mining claim as 
defined by the earlier decisions quotes a California case 
qs fo1lows: 
''From an early period of our state jurispru-
rlence we have re~·arded these claims to public min-
eral lands as ti ties. They are so practically . . . . 
Our courts have gi,'"en them the recognition of le-
g·al estates of freehold; ... " Merritt vs. Jt(,dd, 14 
Cal. 60. 
An early Utah case, Lavagnino vs. [lhlig, 26 Utah 1, 
reported in ·71 Pac. 104n, holds: 
''Mining claims are, regardless of statutory 
provisions, real estate.'' 
vVe submit that the case at bar contains all the ele-
ments of a quiet title action. The complaint alleges that 
plaintiff is the O\vner of and entitled to the possession of 
the property in question and that the defendants have 
nnla-'.vfully interfered with plaintiff's right of possession, 
~nd he asks for a decree quieting title in himself and for 
his ri~ht of possession together with the usual prayer for 
restraint in the event defendants persist in interfering 
\vith plaintiff's decreed rights. 'V 0 sn bmit that the 
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authorities cited above are unanimous in holding that a 
locator's right to a mining claim is one in fee and that 
his right therein is considered as real property; and we 
submit that there is no good reason for considering the 
title to mining claims upon a different legal basis than 
any other real property. 
In vie"\\r of the above authorities and those cited in 
appellant's original brief, it becomes apparent that the 
authorities cited by respondent in 117 A. L. R. 9 (respon-
dent's brief page··:3) are not in point. 
Ref erring to '' C'' of respondent's arguments, it is 
submitted that none of the cases cited by respondents are 
in point. The W ey vs. Salt Lake City case in 101 Pac. 
381, is a case primarily to set aside an illegal tax imposed 
upon the property and to abate the resulting lien upon 
said property. The California case of Proctor vs. Ara-
relian cited in 280 Pac. 368, 'vas one based upon fraud 
and praying that note and deed of trust executed by 
plaintiff be cancelled and was held by the Court to pre-
sent a case on foreclosure of vendor's lien, an equitable 
action precluding a jury trial as a matter of right. The 
California case of City of Tu,rlock vs. Brisfolv, cited in 
284 }"lac. 962, was a matter for abatement of a nuisance 
which the court held only· inYo}y·ed injunctiYe relief and 
'vas purely equitable in nature. 
~! n Section '' D '' of respondents' brief, counsel has 
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Bet forth certain special considerations applying to min-
ing claims, and we have no quarrel with such statements; 
but the fact that mining property may fluctuate in value 
from time to time certainly does not make an equitable 
matter out of one which the courts have held is legal. 
Granting for the sake of arg·ument that a certain mining 
property does fluctuate in value violently as respondents 
indicate might happen from time to time, the action is 
still one to quiet title to that certain mining claim, and 
the plaintiff in the action would certainly be entitled to 
a jury inasmuch as it is for determination of legal rather 
than equitable rights. 
Respondents refer to Nor bach vs. Board of Direct-
ors of Church Ext. Society, (84 Utah 506, 37 Pac. 2d 339) 
\Vhich 'vas cited on page 10 .of appellant's brief, and try 
to detract from the cogency of this citation by reason of 
its having been. determined by a three to two decision, 
but in Buckley vs. Cox, et al, 122 Utah 151, 247 .Pac. 2d, 
page 277, in an action by the plaintiff to quiet title to a 
drive-way over a portion of plaintiff's land, the cour1 
held as follows : 
''Under the criteria set out in N orback vs. 
Board of Directors. 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339, thi~ 
~trtion is one at la'v . . . '' 
Jn respondents' Point E on page 5, respondents con· 
tend that ''An action to determine adverse claims to a 
ioining claim is a suit in equity," and Montana rases are 
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relietl upon for the support of this proposition. ..._t\.ppel-
lant submits that the cases have been decided upon a spe-
e.i al interpretation of the Th.fontana Statute which is not 
similar to our Utah Statute 78-21-1, which defines where-
in a jury trial may be had. The Montana Statute is cited 
in JJlare,s v. Dillon, 30 1\'Iont. 117, 75 Pac. 963, the first of 
the Montana cases cited by respondents. The Montana 
eases are ones in which patent has been applied for, ad-
verse claims filed and the issues drawn under Section 
1322 of the Montana Code of Civil Procedure as set forth 
on page 968 of 75 Pac. This is a statute specifically re-
ferring to mining claims and application for patents and 
determination of special rights of the applicant for the 
patent and one who files an adverse claim. 
Our legislature in Section 78-21-1, U. C. A. 1953, has 
provided for the recovery of specific real or personal 
property by an action at la'v in which issues may be tried 
by jury unless the same is '""aived. 
A quiet ti tie action as sho"\vn by the cases cited in 
appe1lant 's brief and in this reply brief is an action at 
law, and issues of fact therein are to be tried by Jnry 
unless the same is "\vai ved by the parties thereto. 
W ~ fail to see ho'v the case of Gerber rs. Tr'"heele~r, 
115 Pac. 2d 100 (Ida), cited on page 6 of respondent's 
briet is even remotely relevant or can be of assistance to 
respondents. No issue concerning the right to trial by 
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jury was involved, nor was there any discussion as to 
\Vhether a suit to quiet title was one in equity or in la,v. 
CONCLUSION 
\Ve conclude, therefore, that the judgment of the 
trial court should be re·1ersed and the case remanded to 
the l)istrict Court. 
Respectfully stttbmitted. 
ELLIS J. PICKETT' 
SAM CLINE, 
Attorneys for ... 4ppellant. 
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